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A Blueprint for
Online Dispute
Resolution System
Design
By Amy J. Schmitz
great deal of discussion focuses on how arbitration and similar private dispute resolution harms
consumers, and how businesses seek ways to avoid
helping consumers.1 It is often assumed that
companies and consumers are on opposing “teams.”
In reality, however, consumers and companies enjoy
more commonalities than contradictions. Both benefit when deals go well and disputes are resolved
quickly and cheaply.
The problem is that face-to-face dispute resolution can be costly in terms of time and money.
Furthermore, getting lawyers involved may inspire
gamesmanship and adversarial antics aimed to protect
one’s reputation for staying “strong” and refusing to
settle or admit wrongdoing. The solution is a welldesigned online dispute resolution (ODR) system
that harnesses business and consumer commonalities,
and creates a win-win for all stakeholders in eCommerce disputes.2
That is not to say that ODR is the “end-all-beall” for eCommerce disputes. All ODR is not fair and
efficient. In fact, it is tempting to slip into cynicism
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about ODR and the fate of consumers on the Internet.
Consumers assume that businesses will always have
the power —as if bad consumer experiences are inevitable. Some also assume that merchants who provide
internal ODR systems for solving eCommerce claims
must have a hidden agenda, or unfair disadvantage.
Such assumed negativity regarding ODR is wrong.
The Internet undoubtedly generates vulnerabilities for
consumers, but it also creates opportunities for consumer empowerment. The time is right to take advantage of those opportunities. Merchants, payments
providers, consumer groups, regulators, and other policymakers must join forces in addressing this challenge
by creating a unified ODR system that provides fast
and fair resolutions worldwide. Aiming to catalyze this
effort, this essay will address design caveats and provide
criteria for creating a just ODR system.

ADDRESSING ASYMMETRIES
There are many considerations for designing a
just ODR system. The first is to address asymmetries
that tilt the playing field in favor of merchants.
Often commentators and policymakers discuss these
asymmetries in terms of “repeat player advantages,”
which have been documented and debated for quite
some time with respect to arbitration, for example.
This focuses on the fact that merchants generally are
repeat players in dispute resolution processes, and
thus gather information that gives them an advantage
in resolving disputes toward their favor. Furthermore,
these repeat player merchants usually have greater
legal and financial resources than consumers, again
causing the system to tilt in the merchants’ favor.
Said another way, merchants and consumers fare
differently due to the volume asymmetry. Consider
that most consumers only experience one or two
problems with their eCommerce purchases in a given
year, and rarely (if ever) do consumers experience
problems with the same merchant. That means that
even if a consumer experiences multiple purchase
problems, it is likely that the consumer will have to
navigate different complaints processes for each store
or merchant. They may call some companies seeking
remedies, file claims with ODR systems where possible, write emails to other companies, etc. Consumers
therefore gain no repeat player advantages with any
one complaint system.
3
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In contrast, sellers experience problems on
approximately 1 to 3 percent of their overall sales
volume. If a seller sells 100 items a month, that
means 12 to 36 disputes a year. If they sell 1000 items
a month, that is 120 to 360 disputes a year. As sales
volume increases, so do disputes. This volume asymmetry gives the seller a significant advantage. Sellers
are the proverbial “repeat player.” The merchants
learn the system, and can afford to hire the requisite
legal assistance to help them navigate complaints
toward their favor.
This relates to the information asymmetry. The
seller (or the customer service employees working for
the seller) quickly develops a lot of expertise about
how the resolution process works. Sellers know what
policies govern the outcomes rendered by the process, and they know what evidence will likely sway
a decisionmaker. The consumer likely enters the
process with no awareness of how it works, while the
merchant enters the process with a long track record
of lessons learned. That also means that the consumer
must learn the rules as they navigate the process,
while the seller already knows how everything is
going to proceed.
The third asymmetry is the resource asymmetry. Sellers have the resources to support a long and
extended resolution process, while consumers do not.
Sellers also have the funds to retain counsel to deal
with larger claims, and to apply policies for “paying
off” the squeaky wheels, or highly valued consumers
due to their zip codes or history for large purchases.
However, such policies may harm those with the lowest incomes—essentially the consumer “have-nots.”3
These consumers are on their own in navigating
remedy processes and seeking any sort of relief. That
means that a well-designed and fair redress process
must be built for any user, regardless of education
or resources. It must require no legal representation,
understanding of policies and precedents, or presentation of evidence.
Accordingly, there is danger that volume, information and resource asymmetries will converge to tilt
any ODR processes to favor merchants. However, we
can design a resolution process that simultaneously
compensates for the repeat player advantage and
the three types of asymmetry. The solution is to give
consumers control, while providing extensive help
content and algorithmic support to counteract the
information asymmetry that sellers enjoy. Control
4
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comes from simplicity. Consumers gain a sense of
empowerment and control when they can easily
navigate a resolution process without need for legal
assistance or advanced education. In other words,
online consumer redress processes must be very
simple and straightforward for the consumer so that
consumers are not disadvantaged by their lack of prior
experience.
Furthermore, algorithmic support addresses the
information asymmetry by digesting data from prior
cases and complaints, and suggesting fair resolutions.
A well designed ODR system must therefore leverage
information drawn from the experiences of thousands
of other buyers. Armed with data regarding prior
cases and resolutions, consumers will not be left “in
the dark” navigating their way toward a resolution.
Furthermore, system monitoring and external auditing of the ODR process and any algorithms used
should be added to catch repeat player problems when
they arise. Indeed, it is easier to test ODR fairness
than traditional processes due to the ease of system
data collection and use of data auditing techniques.

SETTING A DOLLAR LIMIT
One of the major debates regarding UNCITRAL
Working Group III on ODR focused on the intended
scope of a global ODR system and the definition
of Business-to-Consumer (B2C) verses Business-toBusiness (B2B) cases. Determing whether a buyer is a
consumer or a buisness is not a simple matter. Some
businesses go online to buy large amounts of goods to
stock their brick-and-mortar stores, while other sole
proprietors make very few small dollar purchases and
feel like “little guys” in eCommerce. It also is difficult
to tell whether a seller is a professional or a hobbyist.
If a seller is posting homemade mittens out of her
kitchen, is she a consumer or a professional seller? At
what point does one switch from being a consumer to
being a merchant, and should it matter for determining the scope of a global ODR system?
Accordingly, it seems wise to bypass the debate
regarding what qualifies as a “business” to define
scope for a global ODR system. Instead, the best way
to handle the issue is to simply set a dollar limit for
the system, and include all transactions under that
limit regardless of whether one would view them as
B2C or B2B. This value may be different in different
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geographies, and it will change over time. Of course,
the meaning of “low value” claims comes with its own
difficulties, but it is much easier to tackle. It is nonetheless possible to set an amount, such as $1,000 and
other currency equivalents, as a starting point. The
amount could rise to $5,000 and currency equivalents, as $5,000 often is used for small claims courts
in the United States. This would be a better starting
point than getting hung up on the question of how
to effectively triage cases into B2C and B2B buckets.

B Y PA S S I N G T H E B I N D I N G V S .
N O N - B I N D I N G D E B AT E
The question of whether ODR systems should
deliver binding outcomes has complicated many of
the discussions around consumer redress. Indeed,
dissention remains regarding the legitimacy of any
binding ODR for resolution of B2C claims. There
are strong arguments for evaluative approaches:
Evaluative outcomes can provide 100 percent closure
and can be extremely efficient to deliver at volume.
Some parties also desire an evaluative determination in order to know whether they are “right.”
Furthermore, parties gain assured access to remedies
from final determinations. This gives disputants an
incentive to put forth all their evidence, not holding
facts back for future litigation, as may occur in nonbinding facilitative processes.
That said, policymakers, scholars, and consumer
representatives have criticized binding arbitration
in face-to-face consumer processes. They argue that
pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses undermine
valid consent and the enforcement of statutory consumer protections and other public rights. Many legal
jurisdictions in Europe, for example, forbid the use of
pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses in consumer
transactions. They often reserve evaluative decision making only for public bodies, such as Ombuds
Offices or Consumer Courts. In these geographies, it
would not be legal to require ODR outcomes to be
binding on consumers.
It should be noted that there are ways to deliver
evaluative outcomes in a manner that abides by due
process and fairness standards. For example, increasing transparency and adding external audits assist
fairness of binding processes. Evaluative determinations could be published on a central portal after
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appropriate redaction of private information. This
portal could be easily searchable, and allow consumers and consumer advocates to learn about recently
resolved cases. Although some companies may be
uncomfortable with such transparency, others would
welcome opportunity to garner goodwill and competitive differentiation by complying with consumer
protections and providing remedies to deserving
consumers.
Ultimately, however, consumers should have free
choice. They should not be compelled to abide by a
binding private resolution without full information
to weigh the benefits and costs. Consumers should
retain the right to seek public redress. Therefore,
ODR systems should not block access to the courts for
consumers. But if the systems are well designed, they
will resolve 99.99 percent of consumer cases without
need for judicial redress. Moreover, the process would
expand access to any remedies, since most low dollar
consumer claims would never go to court anyway.
Consumers often are simply left with no recourse
because the costs of pursuing claims outweigh any
likely redress. A free or cheap ODR process would
therefore open avenues to remedies, and advance
consumer protection.

DEALING WITH MASS CLAIMS
Isolating claims in private redress systems prevents the public from learning about major consumer
protection issues. That is a major criticism of arbitration as it currently operates. If every matter is viewed
as a single case, the onus always is on the complainant
to report the incident in order to get their particular
situation addressed. Complainants often do not have
the full picture, as they only know their particular
experience. This makes it very difficult to connect
the dots to identify more systemic problems.
Advocates for mass claim processes such as class
actions argue that resolution processes that require
each aggrieved consumer to file an individual case
will inevitably under-report problems because some
percentage of consumers will not bother to report
their issues. This means that the full extent of the
situation will not be remedied. Class actions, they
argue, are the only means for bringing justice to individuals with low dollar claims and shedding light on
the full scope of the problem to be resolved.
5
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These criticisms have merit, and class actions
can be very powerful. Effective ODR design, however,
can address transparency and allow for new means of
consumer protection without the costs and drawbacks
of class actions. One potential approach can be drawn
from Consumer Ombuds offices in the European
Union. European countries do not have class actions
as we do in the United States; but they are committed to providing strong consumer protection. A
global ODR system can borrow from their design by
including a tripwire-like mechanism. The tripwire is
triggered when a certain number of cases are filed that
fit the same fact pattern.
To some extent, this is happening in the United
States with the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB). As consumers report issues in the
CFPB’s complaint portal, staffers with the CFPB look
for patterns in the reports. If enough similar reports
are filed, the tripwire is activated, and the CFPB will
notify the business and require them to do an investigation to see how many consumers might have been
similarly affected.
It would be very easy to build in such a tripwire for
a global ODR system. Resolutions always should start
at the individual case level, but effective data collection can enable pattern detection algorithms that
make it easier to detect more systemic issues. Some
companies may dislike this idea, as it allows regulators
to “catch” bad actors, but companies should embrace
this idea. It would allow them to learn of issues before
they escalate into costly class claims. Moreover, the
“good guys” benefit when the regulators and consumers become aware of the “bad guy” practices and products. Next generation consumer redress systems must
therefore provide resolutions that scale from single
issues to mass claims within the same platform if they
are to be truly effective.

BUILDING AN ODR TRUSTMARK
Merchant and sales platforms have been designed
to rely heavily on seals or badges to indicate that a
merchant is a trustworthy and reliable transaction
partner. In many environments, these trustmarks,
such as the Better Business Bureau “BBB” seal, or
the TRUSTe logo, are a valuable tool for businesses
looking to establish their legitimacy online. When an
eCommerce merchant first enters a market or region,
6
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the consumers in that region may have no idea
whether it is trustworthy. Trustmarks, particularly
those issued by a well-respected organization or public
agency, can help new customers feel that merchant is
safe and competent.
Trustmarks are especially important for new
merchants in providing consumers with some means
to trust and make purchases. New merchants do not
have ratings or track records. Accordingly, it would
help consumers to feel comfortable buying from new
or smaller vendors if these vendors have earned the
right to post an ODR trustmark that signifies the
vendor’s commitment to an ODR protocol for providing a fair redress mechanism for consumers to obtain
remedies if purchases go awry. Furthermore, this trustmark would go beyond unmonitored review sites and
clear a way toward justice in eCommerce.
That is not to say all trustmarks have value. It
can be extremely difficult for the organizations that
issue the trustmarks to manually monitor the behavior of all of the organizations who have opted into the
trustmark program. Even the BBB has been criticized
for not sufficiently monitoring businesses under its
seal. In addition, other organizations may create fake
or less stringent trustmarks, thereby impairing the
value of all trustmarks and causing confusion as to
which trustmarks are trustworthy. Eventually trustmarks lose meaning and consumers no longer care
about their existence when deciding where and how
to make purchases.
At the same time, some argue that trustmarks
are unnecessary due to review sites such as Yelp and
TripAdvisor, and purchaser reviews on merchant sites
such as Amazon. The argument is that because these
sites aggregate information from thousands of users,
the four or five star rating of a merchant can be trusted
as a good indicator of their reliability. The problem
is that these sites also have lost credibility due to
“flogging,” or posting fake blogs and reviews lauding
products and services. Merchants also hire individuals to post fake reviews touting their own businesses
and/or criticizing competitors. Furthermore, these
reviews generally are unmonitored and their veracity is suspect. Deciphering reviews also is difficult
because they rely on the subjective thoughts of the
poster. This makes reviews a poor stand-in for more
thorough external performance auditing, leaving consumers even more vulnerable to misleading information and bad experiences.
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Accordingly, a well-conceived and monitored
trustmark system would be beneficial for building an
ODR system. There could be one unifying trustmark
that earns respect through proper creation. Private
entities could work in collaboration with government regulators and other external auditors to ensure
that the trustmark system is ethically administered.
Specifically, merchants would earn the right to post
the trustmark by agreeing to follow prescribed ODR
standards of speed, fairness, and accountability. A
public/private consortium would then monitor the
system. A certain amount of this work could be done
digitally with algorithms that catch patterns or lack
of response, but there also would be some costs from
human monitoring. Small subscription fees could
help cover these costs.

SYNTHESIZING DESIGN
CRITERIA
The challenge now is to take these observations
and distill them into a plan of action. The following is
a nutshell meant to catalyze discussion and development.4 Indeed, the time is ripe to bring global ODR
to fruition.

FAST, FREE AND FAIR
First and foremost, we know that consumers want
fast and easy resolutions. Individuals have no desire or
time to pick up the phone and wait on hold or waste
time haggling over a fair solution. Consumers have
endured that pain for far too long. Consumers also
will run from any fees for using a process for simply
getting what they were promised. ODR, therefore,
must be simple to access, free to consumers, and easy
to understand.
This also means that the initiation for the
process should reside in exactly the same location
where the transaction originally took place: on the
merchant’s Web site. The consumer should be easily
able to report an issue, and should get a solution as
quickly as possible. Instant determinations would be
best; failing that, however, a resolution in hours or
days instead of weeks or months.
Online guides and wizards should be available to
enable consumers to easily educate themselves about
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their rights, evidentiary obligations, procedural steps,
and likely outcomes. Consumers must know exactly
what they are getting into when they initiate the
process. They must never feel surprised or misled by
a procedural development that they did not know
about prior to filing the case.
Furthermore, consumers using the system should
not fear retribution for filing a claim. Data collected
should be scrubbed of personally identifying information, and merchants should be prohibited from
“punishing” consumers for filing to seek redress. The
consumers that will use this process are likely to feel
that they have been treated unfairly once, and that
is the reason why they decided to try ODR. We must
do everything in our power to ensure that they do
not feel doubly mistreated by this redress design, and
that it is as easy and straightforward as it can be, in
order to ensure the consumer feels the process was
fast and fair.

HIGHLY SCALABLE
This global ODR system should not simply benefit consumers. It also must benefit merchants or they
will never “sign on” and adopt the system. Scalability
is therefore a must. Scalability makes ODR a
problem-solver for merchants across the globe.
Merchants face an incredible volume of disputes
through eCommerce (projected to be more than
1 billion disputes per year in 2017 and beyond). This
volume of disputes simply cannot be resolved through
human powered resolution procedures. It is much too
expensive for merchants to hire sufficient customer
service representatives and lawyers to deal with all
the disputes eCommerce generates. This makes algorithms incredibly effective and efficient for resolving
eCommerce disputes. For example, algorithms using
data regarding similar disputes could help generate
quick remedies and settlements.
Critics of algorithms argue that computers should
never decide disputes because they eliminate the
compassion and empathy of in-person interactions.
However, that ignores the fact eCommerce is generated online and over the Internet—by and through
computers. Most, if not all, purchasers and merchants
over the Internet do not care about personal connections. They simply want swift transactions and remedies when purchases go wrong. Algorithms that are
7
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carefully constructed and closely monitored have the
power to provide the type of fast and fair resolutions
consumers crave.
That said, not every case can be effectively
resolved by algorithm. The ODR system must work
like a filter, where algorithmic resolutions handle
the easily resolvable cases. This would leave a much
smaller volume that requires human attention. That
means that algorithms will use data to suggest settlements, thereby leading to resolutions of nearly all
cases. Nonetheless, online mediators and arbitrators
could handle the few cases left unresolved. Telephone
and in-person assistance also could be available as a
last resort.
This approach is the only way to make the
system sustainable. Consider that most eCommerce
purchases are under $100. It is very hard to imagine
a human-powered resolution process that will be
able to handle cases at that price point on a costeffective basis. Companies would have to spend
exponential amounts to build up customer service,
along with an abundance of mediators and arbitrators to resolve all of these claims. An ODR process
that handles most issues through algorithms would
therefore save companies costs in dealing with
complaints. Moreover, such ODR would be built to
scale, thus helping solve the customer service problem and assisting merchants to retain happy and
loyal customers.

SECURE
The daily news is filled with stories of scams and
data privacy disasters. Consumers nonetheless are
eager to continue making purchases online. In the
process, however, they want to be sure that their privacy is respected. Consumers want to receive exactly
what they were told they were going to get when they
agreed to the transaction, and they do not want to be
stuck with things without consent. They certainly do
not want to learn that their data has been sold and
used in improper ways.
This brings in security and privacy. Part of being
treated with respect is a commitment to maintaining
consumer privacy. Consumers know that businesses
are tracking when they make online purchases, use
store loyalty cards, or pay for goods or services using
their credit and debit cards. Data brokers track
8
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spending habits, how long one lingers on a Web
site, consumers’ online searching histories, family
information, and even postings on social sites such
as Facebook. Consumers may tolerate this data collection if it is used to improve their shopping experience, but they are intolerant of businesses treating
their private data like another product to be bought
and sold.
This is especially true when seeking remedies
and settlement. A global ODR process must therefore
respect privacy and preclude any sale of collected
data. Some data about claims and issues may be collected, but it only should be used to improve the process
and assist in predicting proper remedies based on similar
cases. Again, that data must be scrubbed of personally identifying information. Moreover, data security
must be a central component of the system. The ODR
platform must be encrypted—and certainly much
safer than email.

AMICABLY TONED
Tone is incredibly important. A global ODR
system must set the right tone or it will fail at the
outset. This is especially true given the variety of
cultures and backgrounds of its users. Therefore,
systems built under the presumption that all
reported issues are fraud will generate frustration
and inspire claims. The data shows that problems
are inevitable, and the majority of them are resolvable through direct communication. Consumers
and merchants want to have successful transactions, and they can be trusted to do the right thing
most of the time.
This means that an ODR system should provide
guided communication flows that provide a proper
mindset. If the language used within a redress flow
presumes ill intent (e.g., filing a “fraud alert” instead
of “reporting a problem”) then the users within that
system similarly will assume that the other side is
a bad actor that needs to be punished. The better
approach is to provide simple flows starting with
“item not received” or “item not as promised.” Factual
flows from these basic starting points keep the communications focused on finding a solution in good
faith.
Ultimately, it is best when consumers and
merchants can resolve a matter through mutual
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agreement and direct communication. That is the
best outcome for a reported problem. This brings us
back to the binding/non-binding debate regarding
arbitration noted above. When evaluative systems
impose a punitive, victim-offender narrative on problems at the outset, one party always will leave the case
feeling frustrated. Accordingly, ODR guided flows
focused on facts and not judgment lead to the highest
satisfaction.

CONSISTENT
An immediate concern regarding ODR is that
it eventually will skew toward the repeat players, as
noted above. Of course, as soon as a redress system
is launched, potential users immediately test it. They
may generate a barrage of cases and try out the different scenarios to see if they can find a seam in the
design that they can exploit. Consider the individual
who continually tries different scenarios in Turbotax
hoping to lower one’s taxes.
Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that
the global ODR system be designed to combat this
type of gaming. When vulnerabilities or perverse
incentives are discovered in the flow, they must
be addressed quickly. As the system matures, and
designers re-code, reconsider, and redraft policies,
new opportunities emerge for the delicate power balance between participants to be negatively affected.
This is especially problematic when the profit
motive comes into play. Good intentions at launch
can come unstuck over the years if the systems
administrators pay too much attention to maximizing the revenue stream. This is a challenge for all
redress systems, public or private, but private interests may be even more susceptible.
That is not to say that private companies should
not play a vital role in creating ODR processes.
Indeed, they are essential because only they are able
to stay abreast of rapidly evolving developments
in technology and the global eCommerce marketplace. But independent evaluators should play a role
in ensuring the fairness of these privately created
processes.
This can begin with tripwires that notify public
regulators and non-profit oversight organizations not
only of large volumes of claims regarding the same
products, but also when it appears that outcomes
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have become skewed. Once filings cross the specified
threshold or indicate that outcomes may be skewed to
favor a certain merchant, regulators may be automatically notified of possible grounds for an investigation
or enforcement action. Also, these tripwires may
result in an automatic public notification to inform
other consumers of a potential recurring problem.
This type of automated action could be important
especially to catch “gamers” and to alert the public of
health or safety issues are at stake.
These automated notification systems also could
ease companies’ overall dispute resolution costs
by making the entire redress process more cost
effective and efficient. The trust benefit obtained
by participating businesses would provide more
than enough economic benefit to justify participation. Furthermore, companies’ participation in the
ODR process should help them avoid any potential
enforcement actions and class claims, and the courts
should view participation in externally audited
third party resolution systems as a strong signal that
companies are committed to treating their customers fairly.

BENEFICIAL TRUSTMARK
As noted above, building a trustmark for ODR
could be beneficial to companies and consumers.
This trustmark should (a) communicate to buyers
that this system is a safe and effective place for them
to resolve purchase problems; (b) earn positive notoriety to set it apart from the morass of other redress
schemes promoted across the Internet; and (c) be
cross-culturally valid and appropriate in a wide variety of geographies.
Ideally the trustmark should create an affiliative
halo from participation if respected public and private
entities contribute their reputations to the administration and management of the system. Quality
merchants will be eager to associate themselves with
leading consumer protection and advocacy organizations, even if participation does generate additional
responsibilities. The goal is to build a reliable resolution process that consumers will come to understand
and utilize, and businesses will realize a trust benefit
from their participation.
Such an ODR trustmark should not be a goal
in itself. Instead, it should be valuable to both
9
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consumers and merchants. It should be the backbone
of a new ODR opt-in mechanism to provide buyers a
tool that they can utilize should a purchase go wrong.
At the same time, it should give merchants credibility, and help them obtain and retain loyal customers.
Accordingly, the program must include mechanisms
to throw out underperforming merchants from the
program. The credibility of the system is dependent
on strict enforcement of the merchant guidelines.
If businesses repeatedly flout the rules and do not
resolve buyer complaints, yet remain in the system,
the trustworthiness of the overall program may be
irreparably damaged.

ENFORCEABLE
Any ODR system that leaves merchants free to
ignore resolutions is useless. Currently, some online
marketplaces have not done the work required to
enable effective enforcement of outcomes. For example, some classified sites do not enable buyers and sellers to hold their transaction partners accountable for
performance once the transaction is complete. Users
may have no fixed username or account, and no concrete way of getting a remedy once payment is made.
The consumer may know nothing tangible about the
merchant, and may be unable to contact them with
any questions or problems.
For example, if an online marketplace provides
only a disposable forwarding email address for a
transaction partner, and the parties make a cash deal
in person, there is no way to resolve a later problem.
Consider the buyer who pays $500 in cash for a laptop, meeting the seller in a parking lot, and then later
discovers the laptop is completely non-functional.
The buyer has no way to contact the seller to ask a
question, and there is no way to reverse the payment
made in cash.
In contrast, an ODR system must be built to
allow for tracking and enforcement. Delivering resolutions to consumers that must then find ways to
enforce is not an effective design. Enforcement
should be automated, effective, and integrated into
the transaction from inception. Merchant contacts
must be tested and tracking must be part of the ODR
system. Furthermore, merchants who fail to abide by
resolutions and settlements must lose ability to post
the trustmark. Ultimately, they must be eliminated
10
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from the program, thus harming their ability to gather
and retain customers.

ADAPTABLE
One of the key attributes of ODR is its adaptability. Any computer coder or software designer will
tell you that no solution is perfect on the first try.
No matter how much research, planning, and testing
one does in advance of bringing a system live, adjustments always are required. Furthermore, regardless
of whether a system seems to be working at launch,
conditions always are changing, which requires any
platform to be able to evolve and adjust if it is to
remain effective over the longer term.
A global ODR system must therefore be ready to
adapt and change. This will be fueled by scalability,
and the high volume caseloads in eCommerce disputes. The system itself will generate a lot of data, and
effective systems designers will then be able to analyze
the data to learn from that flow and continuously
improve the system over time. ODR systems also
have the advantage of being able to engage problems
much earlier in the lifecycle of the issue, and early
resolutions are the most effective. ODR systems also
can offer valuable insights upstream of disputes, so
that the transaction environment itself may be able
to adjust to prevent later misunderstandings that
can turn into problems and disputes. This discipline
of continuous improvement and learning should be
integrated into the ODR system’s design from inception to ensure continued relevance and effectiveness.

CONCLUSION
It is not simple to design and build a global
ODR system that can handle high volumes, cross
cultures, and continuously improve. Key debates
around asymmetries, scope, consent, class claims,
and trust have stymied development of such a system
since UNCITRAL Working Group III ended in 2016.
These debates, however, can be addressed. There are
ways to design an ODR system that will be effective
over the long term. This article aimed to crystalize
key considerations and lay out design criteria to create a foundation for this system. The challenge now is
to engage private and public entities to take the lead
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and work with merchants and consumers on a global
level to take these observations and craft a systems
design that integrates them into an implementable
ODR solution for global eCommerce claims.
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rulemaking/final-rules/arbitration-agreements. On Nov. 1, 2017, the
President signed a joint resolution passed by Congress disapproving
the Arbitration Agreements Rule under the Congressional Review
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Act (CRA). This essentially overturned the CFPB’s proposed rule
that would have precluded enforcement of predispute arbitration
clauses in consumer financial product and service agreements
where it would hinder class actions.
2. See generally, Amy J. Schmitz & Colin Rule, The New
Handshake: Online Dispute Resolution And The Future Of
Consumer Protection (2017). Again, the ideas in this essay are
further distilled and explored in this book.
3. Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations:
Separating Consumer “Haves” from “Have-Nots,” 2014 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 1411-1473 (2015).
4. These ideas are further explored in my book with Colin Rule,
supra n.2.
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The Right to Data Portability
from page 1
INTRODUCTION3
On January 25, 2012, the European Commission
(the Commission) proposed a reform of the EU’s
data protection rules by drafting the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in order to strengthen
online data protection rights and boost Europe’s
digital economy. It was also done to adapt to technological advancements that had taken place in the
previous decade, following the introduction of the
Data Protection Directive.4 While the provisions of
the GDPR build upon those established under the
Data Protection Directive, the rules under the GDPR
are more stringent5 and hold a wider scope.6 The reactions to the GDPR have been mixed. Some scholars7
saw it as a welcome development, however others8
have raised concerns.
The right to data portability in the GDPR will
require businesses to ensure that they can hand over
personal data provided by an individual9 in a usable
and transferable format. The preamble of the GDPR
demonstrates that the right to data portability will be
applicable to cloud computing, Web services, smartphone systems and other automated data processing
systems.10 The right to data portability will apply to
a wide range of areas such as social media, search
engines, photo storage, email and online shops. It
will be equally applicable to banks, pharmaceutical
companies, energy providers, airlines—even small
businesses such as pizza shops or tailors if they are data
controllers and deal with personal data.
The final text of the GDPR was agreed to in the
trilogue between the European Council, Parliament
and Commission on December 15, 2015, and published on May 4, 2016 in the Official Journal of the
European Union.11 After a two-year transition period,
the GDPR will be binding on all member states from
May 25, 2018.
The right to data portability is contained under
Article 20 of the GDPR. It can be seen as an extension of an individual’s right of access under Article 15
of the GDPR.12 It has two key elements: (1) the right
of the data subject to obtain a copy of personal data
from the data controller; and (2) the right to transfer
that data from one data controller to another. The
text of the GDPR arguably limits the scope of the
12
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right to data portability and contained some ambiguities. Following an open public consultation, which
ran through the end of January 2017, on April 5,
2017, the Article 29 Working Party13 approved a
revised and substantive guidance (hereinafter referred
to as the 2017 revised guidelines on data portability)
clarifying some of the ambiguities with regards to the
right to data portability.14
This article examines the right to data portability under the GDPR to establish whether any lessons
can be drawn from the EU experience, particularly
for the United States. This article critically analyzes
the issues raised by Article 20 of the GDPR and
potential enforcement problems. It also gives an
overview of the state of data portability in the United
States and provides lessons to be learned from the EU
experience.

CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE
R I G H T TO DATA P O RTA B I L I T Y —
K E Y I S S U E S I N T H E G D P R 15
LIMITATIONS ON DATA GENERATED
BY THE DATA CONTROLLER
Article 20 of the GDPR only applies to data
provided by the data subject. The Article 29 Working
Party published a summary of discussions that took
place at the Fablab Workshop July 26, 2016.16 It
gave a good overview of key issues in relation to data
portability.
In the context of data portability, Article 29
Working Party highlighted the importance of clarifying what is meant by data that has been provided by
the data subject, as a narrow interpretation of personal data would result in fewer benefits for individuals while a very wide interpretation of it would be a
concern for data controllers.17
As mentioned by Graef et al, the wording of
Article 20 of the GDPR does not clarify whether the
data that has been generated by the service provider
for statistical and analytical purposes, such as online
reputations, could be subject to data portability
or not.18
As pointed out by Graef et al,19 in an auction
Web site such as eBay the contact information and
the advertisements are provided by the seller (data
subject) himself but the provider adds feedback
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scores to the seller’s profile and these form part of
the reputation that a seller has built on. Hence, a
literal interpretation of the adopted text would only
allow the users to move their personal information
to another auction site while not being able to move
their ratings and reputation to another auction site as
the latter is provided by the service provider. For an
online user it is crucial to show that he/she has built a
good reputation when he/she moves on to a different
platform. Without moving this reputation, it is highly
unlikely that the seller would attract new buyers in a
new platform. Ultimately, this can hinder users from
moving to another platform.
The April 2017 revised guidelines on the right to
data portability offer some helpful clarification with
regards to the above-mentioned ambiguity by stipulating that data provided by the individual should include
“the personal data that are observed from the activities
of users such as raw data processed by a smart meter or
other types of connected objects, activity logs, history
of Web site usage or search activities.”20 In other words,
according to the revised guidelines on the right to data
portability the term provided by data subject includes
the data that result from the observation of an individuals’ behavior but it does not cover ‘inferred’ data
resulting from the subsequent analysis of that behavior
by the data controller.21 Hence it could be said that
Article 29 Working Party takes a broader interpretation of personal data, which is a welcome interpretation in terms of extending the scope of data portability
in the EU member states.
In the context of Graeff’s example, buyer/seller
ratings on eBay would fall within the scope of
observed data, which would be portable from one
controller to another, while an average of these
scores calculated by the data controller (processor),
would not.
The Article 29 Working Party also clarifies that
meta data that is needed to meet the data subjects’
objective, to move data from one service to another,
falls within the scope of Article 20 of the GDPR.22
As an example, the right to data portability would
require a data controller to not only transfer the
emails sent and received by the data subject but
also other relevant information such as timestamp
information and other information showing whether
emails have been read or not.
The clarifications in the revised guidelines on
data portability go a long way in meeting the need for
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clarification. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to see
whether data controllers will find ways of circumventing the revised guidelines in order to refuse to transfer
data to another controller and it will be important to
monitor any potential problems in order to address
them in the future.

PRIVACY RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES
Another limitation of the right to data portability concerns the privacy rights of third parties.
As noted by Engels, allowing one user to transfer a
second user’s information to another platform may
violate the privacy rights of a second user.23 For example, when several people appear in a photograph on
Facebook, even if one data subject wants to import it
to another social networking platform, this cannot be
done, as it would impact privacy and data portability
rights of other individuals appearing in that picture.
Another example is a bank transfer with information
pertaining to both buyer and seller. This implication
seems to have been taken into account by the legislators as paragraph 4 of Article 20 GDPR states that the
right to data shall not adversely affect the rights and
freedoms of others.
The revised guidelines by the Article 29 Working
Party make it clear that even if the requested data
might have an impact on the privacy rights of third
parties this does not stop it from being transferred to
another controller.
Their proposed solution to deal with potential
shortcomings is two–pronged. First, “The processing
operations initiated by the data subject in the context of personal activity that concern and potentially
impact third parties remain under his or her responsibility, to the extent that such processing is not, in any
manner, decided by the data controller.”24 In other
words, according to the April 2017 Guidelines on
the right to data portability, if the data relates to the
person making the request as well as third parties, it
is the responsibility of the person making the request
to ensure that data protection right of third parties
are respected.
Second, the revised guidance asserts that “the
rights and freedoms of third parties will not be
respected if the new data controller uses their personal
data for purposes other than to deliver a service to the
data subject who has ported the data.25” For instance,
13
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if the new data controller uses the data of third parties
for direct marketing purposes, it would be contrary to
the revised guidelines on data portability.

TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF DATA
TRANSFER
A significant challenge for the enforcement of
the right to data portability concerns the “technical
feasibility” sought for the data portability across the
platforms. Arguably, what is technically feasible for
one data controller might not be technically feasible
for another data controller. Given the wording of
Article 20(2) of the GDPR it is likely that some
data controllers will contend that such a transfer is
technically infeasible. As a result of this wording the
transfer of data may be undermined and overlooked
by data controllers. As there is no reference to the
Commission’s authority to specify the electronic format necessary for data portability in the GDPR, collaboration among market players is crucial in devising
industry norms and standards.
In its revised guidelines issued on April 2017, the
Article 29 Working Party offers valuable clarification
with regards to the notion of technical feasibility and
controller to controller transfer.
Article 29 Working Party states that “where no
formats are in common use for a given industry or
given context, data controllers should provide personal data using commonly used open formats (e.g.,
XML, JSON, CSV) along with useful metadata at the
best possible level of granularity, while maintaining a
high level of abstraction.”26
As regards “technically feasible” Article 29
Working Party holds that “… direct transmission from
one data controller to another could … occur when
communication between two systems is possible, in a
secured way, and when the receiving system is technically in a position to receive the incoming data.”27
This can be interpreted as there being no impediment
to invest in new functionality where existing systems
do not support controller-to-controller transfer.
In terms of enforcing direct controller-tocontroller portability it seems that the Article 29
Working Party has chosen to rely on two mechanisms to motivate direct transfer: (1) data subject
pressure by empowering data subjects to demand an
explanation as to why data controllers are unable to
14

Januar y

2018

offer direct controller-to-controller portability;28 and
(2) the administrative burden of repetitive data subject requests, where data subjects can be expected
to demand usable data vis-à-vis a range of disparate
systems.29
Whether the pressure from data subjects to
ensure direct controller-to-controller portability will
prove effective, remains to be seen. It will be interesting to see whether data controllers will come up with
ways to circumvent data portability by suggesting that
such transfer is not technically feasible, when it is in
fact possible.
A stricter requirement for direct controllerto-controller transfer could still turn out to be a
necessity, one that in a few years with open Web
technologies will seem both more reasonable and
more feasible.

DISPROPORTIONATE COSTS AND
EFFORTS
Forcing data controllers to transfer personal data
may result in disproportionate costs and efforts.
Article 20 of the GDPR requires an online service to write specialized code—export-import module
(EIM)—that will export data from that service and
import it to another service. As noted by Swire and
Lagos, many small and medium-sized companies do
not have the resources to fully understand the GDPR,
comply with it and write an EIM to move data to
another provider.30
Neither the Commission nor other EU institutions have presented any figures as to the cost of complying with data portability requests. According to a
study by Christensen et al, the GDPR reform would
increase European small and medium-sized enterprises’ annual IT costs by between approximately
€ 3.000 and € 7.200 depending on the industry the
particular SME is operating in, representing between
16 and 40 percent of their yearly average IT budgets.31
It is not clear what percentage of this budget will be
spent responding to data portability requests.
Swire and Lagos also support this point and argue
that the GDPR would impose substantial costs on
suppliers of software and apps.32
While such costs may not be significant for large
companies, the requirement is likely to create problems for small and medium-sized companies. It must
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be noted that complying with the GDPR should not
to be taken lightly due to the heavy fines associated
with failing to do so. According to Article 83(5)
of the GDPR, a data controller that fails to comply
with data portability provisions in the GDPR will
incur administrative fines up to 20 million EUR or
in case of an undertaking up to 4 percent of the total
worldwide annual turnover of the preceding year,
whichever is greater.
The issue of disproportionate costs also was raised
in December 2015 by Baroness Neville Rolfe, the
United Kingdom’s parliamentary Under-Secretary of
State for the Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills. She stated that data portability rules
designed to enable consumers to move their data from
one platform to another should not be too costly as
they can serve as an entry barrier into markets, and
this might have an adverse effect on innovation and
competition.33
The Article 29 Working Party, however, does
make it clear in the guidelines that the role of being
data controller in the European Union moving forward should be considered a normal cost of doing
business along the lines of accounting, insurance,
and other unavoidable costs. The Article 29 Working
Party explicitly holds that the overall system implementation costs cannot “be used to justify a refusal
to answer portability requests.”34 Time will show
whether dealing with data portability requests will be
too costly for businesses or whether these costs could
be seen as an ordinary cost of running a business as
suggested by the Working Party.

PROPRIETARY INFORMATION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
If the personal data that needs to be transferred
contains valuable proprietary information and intellectual property, this might discourage companies/
service providers from creating the proprietary information in the first place.
The case of True Fit,35 an online digital service
helping users of online clothing retailers such as
House of Fraser to find the right cloth sizes for their
shoppers, illustrates this point. The True Fit service
asks shoppers to share a wide range of personal data
such as height, weight, measurements, body type, and
information such as what brand and size their favorite
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clothing comes from. Users share this information
with True Fit, which then shares it with online retailers. Arguably, if True Fit were to be required under the
data portability provision to transfer this data to other
retailers, its business model would become obsolete.
Recital 63 of the GDPR provides that the general
right of access under Article 15 could be restricted if
it adversely affects the rights and freedoms of others, including trade secrets and intellectual property
rights. As the right to data portability can be seen
as an extension of the right of access, arguably the
limitation mentioned in Recital 63 should be applicable in the context of data portability requests. In
other words, when faced with data portability requests
companies, data controllers should be able to strip
valuable data from the dataset if it adversely affects
trade secrets and intellectual property.
Nevertheless, neither recital 68 of the GDPR
pertaining to the limitations of the right to data portability, nor Article 20 of the GDPR specifically suggests that the right to data portability can be limited
if it adversely affects trade secrets and intellectual
property. Hence there was a need for further clarification as to whether the right to data portability might
be restricted when it affects proprietary information
and intellectual property rights.
If companies, such as True Fit, stop creating valuable services based on personal data, clearly this will
have a stifling effect on innovation and consumer
welfare. This would, ultimately, have an adverse
effect on consumers who would be deprived of choice
and useful products.
In the revised guidelines on the right to data portability, the Article 29 Working Party provides some
guidance with respect to the above and holds that
“The right to data portability is not a right for an individual to misuse the information in a way that could
be qualified as an unfair practice or that would constitute a violation of intellectual property rights.”36
Furthermore in its guidance the Article 29 Working
Party suggests that data controllers can provide the
information requested in a form that does not release
information covered by trade secrets and intellectual
property rights.37 However it must be noted that this
might not be always easy to implement. Hence there
is definitely need for further guidance on this issue.
As seen above in the discussion of privacy rights
of third parties, the Article 29 Working Party guidelines on data portability fail to offer protections for
15
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current data controllers, while making it clear that
the data subject, and the receiving data controller
has every right to request data when the purpose is to
provide a service to the data subject, regardless of the
impact on the current data controller.
In light of the above, it is unclear whether a third
party data controller such as True Fit will be able to
stop competitors, or current customers, from receiving information and use their service for free. Time
will show if such firms and services will potentially
suffer due to business models seemingly at odds with
the GDPR, and what the cost of that will be to consumers and to the economy.

ENFORCEMENT ISSUES PERTAINING
TO THE RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY
The main objective of the right to data portability is to empower consumers so that they can get a
copy of their electronic personal data, demand transmission of their personal data to another provider
and switch to other providers.38 Hence, the objective
of the right to data portability overlaps with the
objectives of other areas of law, e.g., competition law,
consumer protection laws, and so forth.
Similar to other data subject rights in the GDPR,
data portability is a right, which needs to be invoked
by the data subject and cannot be relied on by parties such as small and medium sized businesses.
For instance, a small business cannot demand data
portability from its business bank but an individual
can. This raises some problems regarding its legal and
theoretical boundaries, as well as enforcement within
the realm enshrined by the GDPR.
Furthermore, there is no clarity as to whether
users will make use of the right to data portability.
In order to ensure that data subjects invoke the right
effectively, data subjects need to be informed as to
what this right entails.
Hence, Article 29 Working Party should liaise
with national data protection agencies in order to
make sure the necessary investments are made in
educating the public about their rights. As a minimum, national data protection agencies should have
information on their Web sites in plain and simple
language explaining to users how they can approach
the data controller for data portability requests and
advise them on how to make a complaint if the data
16
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controller refuses to provide the data. Making a complaint must be easy and the data subjects should not
incur substantial costs or risks as this might discourage
them from exercising their rights.
Furthermore, while the Article 29 Working Party
guidelines do not refer to enhancing competition
between services as an objective of data portability,
several authors39 have suggested that competition
law and provisions may contribute to the enforcement of data portability legislation, in particular
where the data controller is a dominant actor in a
monopolistic market applying unfair restrictions on
data portability. In this context, failure to offer direct
controller-to-controller data portability without a
valid and sensible reason could be seen as an abuse
of a dominant position (or monopolization in the US
context) and potentially be remedied by competition/
antitrust laws.

PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY RISKS
Security and privacy concerns arise when data is
transferred from one data controller to another. Data
can end up in the wrong hands if access is granted to
the wrong person—an investigator making a pretext
call, a conman engaged in identity theft, a hacker,
or, in some instances, one family member in conflict
with another.40 Ironically, interoperable solutions as
suggested in the GDPR41 could aggravate security
concerns at the expense of uniform rules and processes in this context. Although not seen as the main
cause of the security vulnerabilities, interoperability
is regarded as one of the factors that increase the
number of opportunities for security breaches and the
potential fall-out from such breaches.42 Particularly
for small and medium sized businesses (SME) with
limited resources to invest in data security, this is a
significant concern.
The Article 29 Working Party arguably has not
succeeded in offering more clarity as to what security
standards are expected. It places the responsibility for
data security squarely on the current data controller, and suggests that risk mitigation measures may
include “using additional authentication information,
such as a shared secret, or another factor of authentication, such as a onetime password; suspending or
freezing the transmission if there is suspicion that the
account has been compromised; in cases of a direct
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transmission from a data controller to another data
controller, authentication by mandate, such as tokenbased authentications, should be used.”43
It can be argued that more detailed guidance
should be offered, in particular as regards the extent
of responsibility and mandate a data controller has in
assessing the security of the receiving controller and
the ability of the data subject to keep the requested
data secure. While 20 years of financial records can be
reasonably expected to be safe when controlled by a
bank, they are likely to be a lot less safe if downloaded
as a spread sheet to an unprotected smartphone.
There are situations arguably where a data controller should have the right to refuse data portability due to concerns about security at the receiving
end, hereunder uncertainty about the identity of the
recipient and uncertainty surrounding the receiving
data controller’s ability to protect personal and third
party data.

DATA P O RTA B I L I T Y I N T H E
U N I T E D S TAT E S
Data portability has been a contentious issue in
the United States as well. The United States does
not have a uniform data protection law similar to
the European Union and there is no single regulatory
authority dedicated to overseeing data protection
law in the United States. Concerning the right to
access data collected by companies the United States
relies on a patchwork of state and sector specific
federal laws for credit agencies and data brokers.44
Furthermore, there are many guidelines, developed by
governmental agencies and industry groups that are
part of self-regulatory guidelines and frameworks that
are considered “best practices, which are not legally
binding.45
In the United States, the Federal Trade
Commission is the federal privacy regulator regarding
consumer protection, which also is relevant for the
online environment.
Needles to say in the United States there is not a
single provision that deals with the right to data portability, which is comparable to the European Union.
In the United States, data portability generally is seen
as an access to information/data issue.
The 1996 Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIIPA) is the first and most
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wide ranging data portability initiative giving individuals the right to access personal health information collected about them,46 delivered, e.g., on a
storage device such as a USB drive. While offering
the right to access data HIPAA does not currently
address the need for controller–to–controller data
portability.
In 2010, former US President Obama launched a
series of initiatives entitled “My Data initiatives” to
ensure that US citizens has easy and secure access to
their own personal data.47
My Data Initiatives required the US Government
to work together with the Federal Government, public and private sector to facilitate US citizens’ access
to their own personal data in a variety of sectors. As
an example, Blue Button,48 a data healthcare initiative, aimed to expand patients’ access to their medical records so that data subjects can track their own
health records and health information, which also
can be shared with doctors and specialists.49
The Green Button50 initiative allowed US citizens to access their detailed household or building
electricity records in order to facilitate virtual energy
audits with a view to identify inefficiencies and save
money by switching providers.51
My Transcript52 initiative allows data portability for the Internal Revenue Service and finally My
Student53 Data initiative allows US students to download information in relation to federal student grants
and or loan information.
As pointed out by Macgillivray and Shambraugh,
many private service providers have embraced data
portability but there are still many other areas where
data portability has not been required under US law
and is not available in particular.54
On September 30, 2016, the Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) asked various stakeholders their thoughts on the potential benefits and
drawbacks of increased data portability, the industries that would most benefit and be harmed by
increased data portability, the specific steps the
Federal Government and private companies and
others might adopt to encourage greater data portability and the best practices in implementing data
portability.55
OSTP received 23 comments from several stakeholders including companies, trade associations,
advocacy groups, and individuals.56 Roughly half of
the commentators limited their comments to health
17
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data and data portability pertaining to it. Many
commenters praised the potential benefits of data
portability for users. The respondents suggested that
an increased data portability would improve financial
awareness, increase user exploration of new services,
ease the burden of backing up data, increase user control and user trust and lower barriers to entry for services.57 Some commentators raised concerns as to the
cost of data portability and the increasing complexity
of data portability between services due to the lack of
commonly agreed standards.
Furthermore, some respondents suggested that
data portability requirements might raise barriers to
entry if they prove too be too burdensome to implement. One commentator summed up the views of
several other commentators by stating that “portability should be incentivized but not mandated.”58
Some commentators suggested that mandatory data
portability rules would be inefficient, ineffective and
be premature for rapidly developing industries and
this might have a negative impact on innovation.59
Finally,respondents suggested that the government
could incentivize data portability by increasing consumer awareness of it, leading by example or through
encouraging interoperability and open standards,
which would create the right environment for data
portability.60
As data continues to increase in value both to
users and service providers, ensuring data portability will become ever more crucial. From the above
consultation, it is clear that data portability is quite
desirable in the United States as well. Nevertheless
based on the answers of the respondents it might be
said that having a mandatory rule that applies across
all sectors, is not very desirable for the industry stakeholders. Sarah Holland from Google illustrates this
point and states that “one size fits all” requirements in
relation to data portability may promote consistency
but it is an ineffective approach, as it might create
artificial barriers to new services entering the market
place.61 Arguably the right to data portability in the
European Union and its successful implementation
could prove useful in alleviating the concerns of the
industry players.
The OSTP consultation and the responses
obtained from various stakeholders provide very useful insights in relation to data portability in the US
context. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the
OSTP consultation received only 23 responses and
18

Januar y

2018

the majority of the responses were obtained from
industry players and associations. This shows that
there is a need for a more extensive consultation and
debate in the United States, which takes into account
the views of diverse stakeholders particularly consumers to have a more nuanced and more insightful
review of the right to data portability.

C O N C L U S I O N — W H AT L E S S O N S
C A N B E D R AW N F R O M T H E E U
EXPERIENCE
The objective of this article was to examine
development of the right to data portability in the
European Union under the GDPR with a view to
establish whether any lessons can be drawn from the
EU experience particularly for the United States.
As with the exception of sector specific regulation for the Health Sector (HIPAA) and voluntary
programs, there is as of yet no such thing as data portability provision in the United States comparable to
Article 20 of the GDPR. Hence a side-by-side comparison between the European Union and the United
States is not relevant.
The GDPR is unprecedented in geographical
reach and in scope, far surpassing any equivalent legislation anywhere in the world. The European Union
currently is in uncharted territory as it sets out to
break new ground in the area of data governance and
in particular in the context of data portability rights
for individuals. As such the European Union can offer
the United States and other jurisdictions a wealth of
insight as it explores ways of driving data portability
across sectors.
First, the United States operates under the
assumption that data portability is a choice for data
controllers, not a right for data subjects. As such,
much of the insight offered by the development of
right to data portability under the GDPR has little
relevance until the United States decides to see data
portability as a fundamental right for data subjects.
While the above-mentioned My Data Initiatives are
commendable and certainly have driven innovation
(although with limited adoption) in specific industries, they only apply to those industrial actors who
see moral and economic sense in data portability
and there is no penalty for not complying with these
initiatives. In this regard, the first thing the United
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States can take away from the data portability legislation in the GDPR may be as simple as: In the near
future some form of legislation that comprises a right
to data portability at federal level which applies to
all industries and all firms, not just to a select few,
is required. Such legislation does not need to be as
rigid as the GDPR and can be shaped by taking into
account the views of all relevant stakeholders including industry players and consumers.
Second, if and when the United States eventually decides to catch up and adopt data protection
legislation, which includes a right to data portability
they will benefit from second mover advantage, being
able to walk in the steps of the European Union
where advantageous, while avoiding known pitfalls.
The GDPR is far from being perfect and arguably
still a work in progress however the United States
and other jurisdictions definitely will benefit from
following the European discourse with regards to the
definition of data observed by the data subject, the
privacy rights of third parties, the possible need for
enforcement pertaining to direct transfers between
data controllers, the treatment of proprietary information and intellectual property rights, privacy and
data security risks in transferring information in order
to draw lessons.
Third, the United States probably will benefit from observing the agile process with which the
GDPR, and maybe Article 20 in particular, has seen
the light of day. The GDPR deals with new technological realities in fast moving markets. To expect
perfection from the GDPR would be unrealistic. The
combination of the GDPR combined with guidelines
seems to be working very well in this context, offering a reasonably high degree of predictability in an
emergent environment.
As the article demonstrates, the United States
barely has started addressing data portability; nevertheless US firms will have to comply with the
requirements of the GDPR in the European Union as
of May 2018. While the main purpose of the GDPR
is to give EU citizens control over their personal data,
it has an extra territorial reach. The GDPR applies to
any company that operates in the European Union.
Hence a large amount of US businesses including
Google, Facebook, Microsoft that collect data from
EU data subjects need to comply with the GDPR to
avoid hefty fines. In this respect, it is likely that the
United States will soon have to engage with the need

for convergence in global data protection and more
specifically data portability policy.
For the European Union and the United States,
important research themes are emerging. In the context of this article, three themes stand out.
First, in order to ensure successful enforcement of
data portability there is a need to monitor and analyze
the reasons offered by data controllers for refusal to
comply with data portability requests, in particular
relating to direct transfer between data controllers. This way, future guidelines can be adopted to
address issues that hinder controller to controller data
portability.
Second, interdisciplinary research is needed to
ascertain the economic effects of data portability
under the GDPR. As mentioned by several commentators,62 personal data is the new oil. Hence
legislating how an individual’s personal data should
be made available to other parties has wide ranging
consequences and such legislation should be treated
very cautiously. It is important to ascertain to what
degree the data portability provision under Article
20 of the GDPR drives innovation, economic growth
and consumer welfare, delivering on the promise of
the European Digital Economy.
Finally, it is inspiring to see the results achieved
by the US My Data initiatives such as Green Button.
In this respect, the European Union would clearly
benefit from research into what the United States
gets right, in particular with reference to driving
innovation and economic growth through constructive and transparent engagement with industry.
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